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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of our empirical studies of current 
management practices in services acquisition in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The 
primary objective of these studies was to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
how services acquisition is being managed within as well as across individual 
military Services.  In these empirical studies, we developed and deployed a web-
based survey to collect primary data.  Specifically, we studied the current 
management practices in areas such as contract characteristics, and we studied 
acquisition management methods, including regional- or installation-level acquisition, 
use of the project management approach, acquisition leadership, and ownership of 
requirements.  We also studied other program management issues such as the 
ability of personnel responsible for acquisition, adequacy of acquisition billets and 
their fill rates, and training provided to services acquisition personnel. 
We found that for the most part, the services contracts awarded and 
administered conformed to our expectation.  For example, most services contracts 
are competitively bid, fixed-priced awards with minimal use of any type of contract 
incentives.  The survey data also confirmed that the Navy uses a regional approach 
in services acquisition, while the Army and the Air Force use an installation-level 
approach.  These differences, in turn, appear to be having important implications for 
other acquisition management practices, such as the use of project management 
and contract surveillance.  One surprising finding of the study was that the project 
teams are often led by the contracting officer as opposed to by a formally designated 
project manager who is responsible for the overall success of the service project.  
Finally, the survey respondents indicated that the number of authorized staff 
positions for services acquisition was inadequate and that the existing billets were 
inadequately filled. 
The analysis and comparison of management practices in different military 
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recommendations for improving the management of the services supply chain in the 
Department of Defense. 
Keywords: Service Supply Chain, Services Acquisition, Service Lifecycle, 
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1.0 Introduction 
The service sector represents the largest and fastest growing segment of the 
economies of the U.S. and other developed countries. For example, in the U.S., 
services accounted for over 80% of employment in the year 2004 (Department of 
Labor, 2005).  This growth of services in the overall economy has been mirrored by 
the growth of services acquisition in private-sector companies (Smeltzer & Ogden, 
2002) and in the government. For example, as seen in Figure 1, the procurement of 
services in the DoD has continued to increase in scope and dollars in the past 
decade.  Even considering the high value of weapon systems and military equipment 
purchased in recent years, the DoD has spent more on services than on supplies, 
equipment, and systems together (Camm, Blickstein, & Venzor, 2004).  Specifically, 
the DoD obligations on contracts have more than doubled between fiscal years 2001 
and 2008—to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just for services (GAO, 
2009c).  The procured services presently cover a very broad set of service 
activities—including information technology and telecommunications services; 
maintenance and repair of equipment; professional, administrative, and 
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As the DoD’s services procurement continues to increase in scope and 
dollars, the DoD must give greater attention to the management of services 
contracts. However, the increase in services contracting has coincided with a 
reduction in the federal government workforce.  For example, the size of the federal 
workforce fell from 2.25 million in 1990 to 1.78 million in 2000 (GAO, 2001).  This 
mismatch between the increasing workload and the decreasing size of the 
workforce, and the unique nature and complexities associated with services 
acquisition, has possibly created an environment wherein following the best 
practices has not always been feasible.  For example, between 2001 and 2009, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 16 reports related to trends, 
challenges, and deficiencies in contracting for services.  In addition, between 2002 
and 2008, the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) issued 142 reports on deficiencies 
noted in the DoD acquisition and contract administration process. Both, the GAO 
and DoD IG have identified market research, contract type, project management, 
requirements management, personnel training, and contractor oversight as just 
some of the critical deficient areas in services contracts.  Further discussion of these 
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 The government is required to conduct market research to determine the 
market’s capability for providing the required supply or services and the 
government’s appropriate contracting strategy for the procurement (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008).  Reports have shown that the DoD has not conducted 
adequate market research during procurement planning of services contracts 
(GAO, 2002a; DoD IG, 2009).    
 Selecting the appropriate contract type is essential to ensuring the 
appropriate sharing and allocation of risk between the government and the 
contractor.  Fixed-price contracts allocate the majority of the cost risk to the 
contractor, while cost-reimbursement contracts provide for most of the cost 
risk to be borne by the government.  Government reports have shown that 
inappropriate contract types were used in services contracts, resulting in 
more risk to the government (GAO, 2001; DoD IG, 2009).    
 The use of project management tools and techniques, such as designated 
formal project managers, project teams, and project lifecycles, have been 
considered a best practice in managing services contracts.  GAO reports 
have shown that the DoD lacks the proper management structure and 
processes for managing services contracts (GAO, 2007b; DoD IG, 2009).   
 Sufficient requirements management is essential for identification and 
development of needs for the DoD.  If requirement management is 
insufficient, the resulting services contracts will not adequately meet the 
customer’s needs.  The GAO and DoD IG reports have identified poorly 
defined requirements and insufficient requirements management as problems 
in services contracts (GAO, 2007b; DoD-IG, 2009). 
 Defense contract management requires specialized skills and competencies 
that come from extensive training and experience.  A properly trained and 
competent acquisition workforce is considered the heart of successful 
defense acquisition management.  With the downsizing of the DoD workforce, 
the lack of a qualified acquisition and contracting workforce to manage the 
increase workload in DoD services contracts continues to plague DoD 
services contracting efforts (GAO, 2002b, 2009b). 
 The essence of DoD contract management is the proper administration of 
contracts and oversight of contractor performance. The lack of effective 
contract administration and contractor oversight increases the government 
risk of not ensuring total value for the dollars spent on services contracts.  
The GAO and DoD IG reports have consistently identified contract 
administration and contractor oversight as problem areas in the management 
of services contracts (GAO, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; DoD IG, 2009).  
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Indeed, DoD contract management has been listed as a “high-risk” area by 
the GAO since 1992 (GAO, 2009a). This high-risk status reflects the DoD’s 
challenges in achieving their desired outcomes in terms of meeting the services 
procurement cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  The DoD is at risk of 
paying higher prices for services than necessary.  Recently, the DoD Director of 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) identified the inappropriate use 
of services contracts in the DoD (DPAP, 2007) and is planning to take actions to 
improve contracting for services throughout the DoD (DPAP, 2006). 
Service production differs from manufacturing production in several ways due 
to distinguishing characteristics of services.  There is a growing body of literature on 
operations management in service firms.  The key characteristics of services 
discussed in textbooks (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2006; Metters, King-Metters, & 
Pullman,  2003) include the intangibility of service output, co-production, simultaneity 
of production and consumption, the inability to store services, and the complexity in 
the definition and measurement of services.  These characteristics also lead to 
differences in the marketing of services (Lovelock, 1992; Hutt & Speh, 1998). 
Given these differences in the production and marketing of services as 
opposed to that of manufactured products, it is natural to ask if the acquisition of 
services is essentially the same as acquisition of products or do differences exist?  
And, if the differences exist, then what they are, in general and for specific services, 
and what do they imply for the management of services acquisition?  Given the 
growth in size and scope of services acquisition in today’s economy, these questions 
are undoubtedly important.   
A survey of academic literature indicates that there exist only a handful of 
studies aimed at addressing some of these questions.  For example, Smeltzer and 
Ogden (2002) examined purchasing professionals’ perceived differences between 
purchasing materials and purchasing services; Ellram, Tate, and Billington (2004) 
developed a supply chain framework appropriate for a services supply chain by 
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models; and Schiele and McCue (2006) studied the acquisition of consulting 
services in the public sector.  Although these and other studies have started to 
address some of the questions identified above, for the most part, these questions 
remain unanswered.  Furthermore, given the peculiarities of government 
procurement and the GAO and DoD IG reports on the deficiencies in the DoD 
acquisition and contract administration processes, there exists a unique and 
significant opportunity for conducting research into the management of services 
acquisition in the DoD. 
We have addressed the need for research in the area of services acquisition 
by undertaking a series of research projects.  The first two research projects were 
exploratory in nature.  In the first project, we tried to understand the major 
challenges and opportunities in the service supply chain in the DoD (Apte, Ferrer, 
Lewis, & Rendon, 2006) by undertaking in-depth case studies on the acquisition of 
services in three different organizations: Presidio of Monterey, Travis Air Force 
Base, and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM).  The second research 
project was targeted at studying the program management infrastructure (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007).  In this same research project, we conducted two additional in-depth 
case studies of innovative project management approaches at the Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC) and at Air Combat Command (ACC). 
The next two research projects were survey-based empirical studies aimed at 
developing a more comprehensive understanding of how services acquisition is 
being managed at a wide range of Army, Navy, and Air Force installations.  
Specifically, the third research project was aimed at understanding management of 
services acquisition in the Navy and the Air Force (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2008), 
while the fourth research project was aimed at the Army contracting centers (Apte, 
Apte, & Rendon, 2009). 
The objective of the fifth research project, the preliminary results of which are 
being reported in this study is to analyze the primary data collected in earlier 
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so as to develop a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of how 
services acquisition is being managed within as well as across individual military 
Services.  The analysis of survey results will focus on the following areas: contract 
characteristics, acquisition management methods, project-team approach, services 
acquisition leadership, and other management issues. The results of this analysis 
and comparison will be used as the basis to develop preliminary, department-
specific recommendations for improving the management of the services supply 
chain.   
The paper is organized into four sections, including the current introductory 
section.  In the next section, we describe the empirical studies we conducted, 
including the survey research methodology we used in the study. We provide the 
results of the survey data analysis and some salient observations in the third 
section.  The findings and conclusions of the study and our recommendations for 
improving services acquisition and for future research are presented in the fourth 
section.  We wish to point out that the tables summarizing the survey data can be 
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2.0 Research Methodology and the Empirical 
Studies 
The methodology used in this research consisted of a survey instrument 
specifically developed to address the research objectives and questions mentioned 
in the Introduction section.  This was a web-based survey instrument developed 
using the SurveyMonkeyTM software. The developed survey was first pilot tested for 
its validity (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007) and was fine-tuned prior to its use in the 
third and the fourth research projects. 
The survey began with questions that focused on specific demographic data 
and then asked specific questions related to the approach, method, and procedures 
used in the acquisition of services for specific categories of services.  The categories 
of services targeted in this research were (1) professional, administrative, and 
management support, (2) maintenance and repair of equipment, (3) data processing 
and telecommunications, (4) utilities and housekeeping, and (5) transportation and 
travel.  These categories were selected because collectively they represent a 
significant fraction of spending for all the services, and are commonly acquired in 
Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
The survey instrument included core questions related to the methods and 
procedures used in the acquisition of services for the service categories mentioned 
in the paragraph above.  These core questions focused on the following areas: 
Contract Characteristics.  The purpose of this category of questions was to 
gain insight into the dominant procurement methods and contract types used in the 
acquisition of services. The contract characteristics examined in this section were 
degree of competition (competitively bid or sole source), contract type (fixed price or 
cost type), and type of contract incentive (incentive fee, award fee, or award term).   
Acquisition Management Methods.  The purpose of this broad category of 
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acquisition of individual services at each phase of the contract management 
process.  For each of the contract management phases, the survey asked whether 
the phase was conducted at a regional, installation, or some other organizational 
level.  This core question category also focused on whether a project-team approach 
was typically used in the acquisition of the respective service category.  The 
questions explored the position of the services acquisition project team leader, such 
as a program/project manager or contracting officer. The questions also explored 
information on the owner of the requirement for the service being acquired. 
Other Program Management Issues.  This last category of core questions 
focused on the use of a lifecycle approach, the length of assignments for services 
acquisition management personnel, the use of market research techniques, the level 
of staffing in services acquisition management, and the level of training of services 
acquisition management personnel.  These questions used a Likert-type scale to 
measure the level of agreement or disagreement among the respondents’ 
statements. 
The questionnaire described above was used to conduct surveys in all three 
military Services. What follows is a summary of these survey-based empirical 
studies. 
 Army: The standardized survey was deployed to 81 contracting offices.  
The survey was distributed across 8 major contracting centers 
throughout the Army, including 40 Army installations.  We received a 
total of 61 responses to the survey, with a survey response rate of 
75%. 
 Navy: The data was collected in the Navy survey at the installation 
level.  The data inputs were provided by the Navy Regions in charge of 
the installations in CONUS.  We received inputs from 6 Regions, 
covering 66 Navy installations plus Naval Supply (NAVSUP) and Naval 
Medical Logistics Command (NMLC). 
 Air Force: The survey instrument was deployed to 50 Air Force 
Contracting Squadrons, representing 6 Air Force major commands.  
There were 34 responses from the survey, resulting in a 68% response 
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3.0 Analysis and Comparison of Survey Data 
In this section we present the results of our analysis of survey data 
concerning the acquisition management practices in the Army, Navy and Air Force, 
arranged into the data categories described in the Research Methodology and the 
Empirical Studies section. 
3.1 Contract Characteristics 
We discuss three aspects of contract characteristics: degree of competition, 
type of contracts, and contract incentives.   It should be noted that the Navy and the 
Air Force surveys were conducted in 2008, while the Army survey was conducted in 
2009.    Consequently, the Army survey results contain data for 2008, while the data 
streams for the Navy and the Air Force surveys end in 2007.  We used the contract 
characteristic data for 2007 and computed averages across services and acquisition 
phases to obtain measures of contract characteristics.  The comparison of contract 
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Figure 2. Contract Characteristics 
Degree of Competition 
Providing for full and open competition is a public policy and statutory 
requirement in government contracting.  The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 
(CICA) is a public law enacted to increase the number of government procurements 
conducted using the procedures of full and open competition.  Unless the 
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procurement must provide for full and open competition in the solicitation and award 
of the contract. In addition to supporting accountability and transparency in 
government contracts, competitive procurements also result in competitively priced 
proposals that increase the government’s ability to negotiate a fair and reasonable 
contract price. 
As we note in Figure 2A, the predominant procurement approach used in the 
services we studied was full and open completion.  Since these services—
administrative, maintenance, data processing, utilities/housekeeping, and 
transportation services—are traditional and commercial in nature, it would follow that 
the competitive marketplace would be capable of proposing and competing for these 
contracts. However, we also note that a small but notable portion of contracts for 
Navy and Army were sole sourced.  We do not have detailed data on these sole-
sourced contracts, but perhaps the services acquired were context specific and 
unique in nature. 
Contract Type 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation categorizes the major contract types as 
fixed-price and cost reimbursement.  Each of the various types of contracts 
(specifically cost-reimbursement versus fixed-price contracts) reflects the sharing 
and allocation of risk between the buyer and the seller.  Fixed-priced contracts are 
appropriate for well-defined requirements in situations with a low performance risk.  
By using these types of contracts, the contractor holds the major burden of risk.  On 
the other hand, under cost-reimbursement contracts, which are appropriate for 
developmental requirements, the performance risk is high.  In these types of 
contracts, the government shares the major burden of risk.  Given the commercial 
and low-risk nature of the services being studied, firm-fixed price contracts would be 
the appropriate contractual instrument for these service projects. We note in Figure 
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In some situations, the government may want to subjectively incentivize the 
contractor to meet higher levels of performance and go beyond the basic 
requirements of the contract.  In these situations, award-fee or award-term contract 
incentives may be used.  In award-fee/term contracts, the contractor may earn 
additional money (or contract periods of performance for services contracts), based 
on the government’s evaluation of the contractor’s superior performance. Since 
commercial services are usually well understood and the output or outcome can be 
reasonably well defined, there is less need to use contract incentives.  This 
observation is reflected in Figure 2C. 
3.2 Acquisition Management Methods 
In this subsection we provide a comparison of Army, Navy, and Air Force 
practices in two areas: the organization level at which services are acquired and the 
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Figure 3. Acquisition Management Methods 
Organizational Level at Which Services Are Acquired 
The military departments procure services and manage services acquisitions 
at the installation level or regional level.  The proximity of locations where the 
acquisition contracts are managed and where the services are actually performed 
may have an impact on the effectiveness of the project management, as well as the 
success of the services projects.  Services performed at one location, with the 
contract and overall project managed at a distant location, may result in less than 
adequate management and control of the project as well as less than proper 
surveillance of the service contractor.   Insufficient control of the project and less 
than adequate surveillance of the service contractor increases the risk to the DoD of 
not receiving the full value of its service procurement dollars. 
However, in general, it is not possible to say if acquiring services at one 
specific approach ― regional-level or installation-level ― is necessarily better than 
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to economies of scale, uniformity of procedures, and the possibility of consistently 
using best acquisition practices.   On the other hand, installation-level acquisition 
(decentralized procurement) allows for easier implementation of project 
management and program management approaches, including accurate 
requirements definition and proper surveillance.  Under either approach, however, a 
key to success is adopting suitable management practices. 
We note in Figure 3A that services acquisition in the Navy takes place 
predominantly at the regional level, whereas services acquisition in the Army and the 
Air Force occurs predominantly at the installation level. As we discuss later in this 
section and the next, this difference in approaches has a significant influence on 
effectiveness of various management practices such as the use of the project-team 
approach and the position of the person who provides the contractor surveillance   . 
Project-Team Approach 
Service acquisitions, such as information technology services or aircraft 
maintenance services, are typically technically complex and require support from 
various functional areas such as engineering, procurement, finance, and logistics.  
Best practices in project and contract management reflect the use of project teams—
specifically cross-functional teams—in the management of services projects.   The 
use of project teams facilitates the proper integration and control of the various 
functional disciplines involved in the project effort.  Insufficient control and functional 
integration of project activities increases the risk of not achieving the project’s cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives. 
We note in Figure 3B that the Army and Air Force use the project-team 
approach more frequently than the Navy, which uses it slightly more than 50% of the 
time.  A plausible explanation is that, in general, when services are acquired at the 
installation level, the physical proximity of personnel can make it easier to establish 
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approach by the Navy means that it has less opportunity to use the project teams.  
Perhaps a virtual-team approach may need to be adopted by the Navy.  
Acquisition Leadership 
In addition to the use of project teams, another best practice is formally 
designating a trained project manager/leader with the authority to lead the project 
effort.  The project manager is typically a coordinator and integrator of the various 
functional disciplines involved in the project and has overall responsibility for the 
project’s success.  The project manager is focused on the overall objectives of the 
project and on integrating and balancing the interests of the various functional 
disciplines (engineering, procurement, finance, and logistics) involved in the services 
project.  Figure 4 provides answers to the question: Who leads the services 
acquisition project, a contracting officer (CO) or quality assurance evaluator 
(QAE)/contracting officer representative (COR)?  Figure 4A shows that when a 
project team is used, the CO predominantly leads the services acquisition project in 
the Army and Air Force and leads it only slightly more than half of the time in the 
Navy.  Figure 4B also shows that when a project team is not used, the CO 
predominantly leads the services acquisition project in the Air Force and Navy and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 16 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
  






















Figure 4. Acquisition Leadership 
 
Requirement Ownership 
Services acquisition includes managing the requirement.  The requirement is 
the specific service that is being procured—for example, information technology 
services or aircraft maintenance services.  It is important to note that the contract 
management process and, more specifically, the authorities and responsibilities of 
the contracting officer, do not include requirements management activities (such as 
determining the requirement, modifying the requirement, assessing the effectiveness 
of the requirement, or terminating the need for the requirement).   These 
requirements management authorities and activities belong to the requirements 
manager of the organization responsible for the service being procured.  Once the 
requirements organization identifies, develops, and defines the requirement, the 
contracting organization performs the contracting activities to procure the needed 
service.  Contracting officers, however, may support the development of the 
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area.  For example, an aircraft maintenance squadron would own the aircraft 
maintenance service requirement being procured by the contracting organization for 
that specific installation.  Figure 5 provides data on who owns the requirements, the 
CO or QAE/COR 






















Figure 5. Requirements Ownership 
In general, the practice of having a contracting officer (CO) lead the 
acquisition, or own the requirements is not appropriate, regardless of whether a 
project-team approach is used.  What is surprising from the survey data shown in 
Figure 4 is that the project teams are frequently led by the contracting officer as 
opposed to by a formally designated project manager responsible for the overall 
service project’s success.  We consider this finding surprising since the contracting 
officer is a functional specialist concerned with ensuring that the contractor is in 
compliance with the government rules about the contracts, while a project manager 
is concerned with the overall success of the project, in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives.  In addition, a project manager typically represents the 
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requirement during contract performance.  Contracting officers do not have the 
authority to make changes to the service requirement and, traditionally, do not have 
the expertise or technical knowledge to make such changes (for example, making 
changes to the requirements for aircraft maintenance service).  The role of leading 
project teams involves managing the requirement and authorizing related technical 
changes to the requirement during contractor performance.  We also observed the 
following in Figures 4 and 5:   
 As seen in Figure 4 for the Army and Air Force, the use of a project 
team increased the probability of the CO leading the services 
acquisition. 
 As seen in Figure 4 for the Navy, perhaps due to regional organization, 
the use of project teams decreased the probability of the CO leading 
the acquisition. 
 The above two trends are also observed in Figure 5 for the 
requirements ownership. 
3.3 Program Management Issues 
The first set of program management issues we investigated was the scope 
and ability of personnel responsible for services acquisition.  Figure 6 provides 
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Figure 6. Scope and Ability of Personnel Responsible for Acquisition 
Contractor Surveillance  
We note in Figure 6A that, as expected, the contracting officer always writes 
and awards contracts in the Navy and the Air Force.  In the Army, the CO 
predominantly writes and awards the contracts.  It is unclear why this is the case. 
Another critical aspect of services acquisition is contractor surveillance.  
Contractor surveillance ensures that the contractor’s performance complies with the 
requirements of the contract and, thus, the government is receiving the services 
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personnel should be knowledgeable about the technical aspects of the service and 
be ideally drawn from the technical community responsible for the service 
requirement.  Thus, it is critical that surveillance personal have the requisite 
technical skills for conducting contractor surveillance. 
We note in Figure 6B that, as expected, in the Air Force and the Army, 
QAE/CORs predominantly provide contractor surveillance.  However, in the Navy, 
QAE/CORs provide contractor surveillance in about 50% of the cases, with the 
contracting officer shouldering that responsibility in the remaining cases.  These 
results indicate another situation in which contracting officers may be performing 
activities outside their area of expertise—in this case, performing contractor 
surveillance.  Contractor surveillance involves technical knowledge and expertise in 
the service requirement area.  A contracting officer, considered a business advisor 
with expertise in government contracting rules and regulations, should not be 
performing technical contractor surveillance on an aircraft maintenance service 
contract.  Perhaps this is related to and caused by the regional approach to services 
acquisition being adopted by the Navy.  
Finally, we studied the length of time COR/QAEs spend in their assigned 
position.  The comparative data is presented in Figure 6C.  We note the following: 
 The majority of COR/QAEs in the Air Force were assigned in the 
position for less than three years.  Perhaps this is caused by significant 
turnover in staff. 
 In the Navy, a significant percentage of COR/QAEs were in the job for 
more than three years.  Interestingly, this seems to be the case in spite 
of the fact observed earlier that the contracting officer is responsible for 
surveillance half of the time. 
The final category of survey data consisted of other miscellaneous issues 
related to services acquisition program management.  These include the use of the 
lifecycle approach in routine and non-routine services, the adequacy of services 
acquisition billets, responsibility of various staff members, and the training given to 
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Figure 7. Lifecycle Approach 
Lifecycle Approach 
The use of a lifecycle to manage and control the progress of a project is 
considered a best practice in project management (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The 
project lifecycle allows the project to be managed in phases, with each phase 
controlled by gates and decision points.  The use of a project lifecycle should be a 
concern for ensuring proper management of service projects, especially nonroutine 
services.  If the services being procured and managed are of a nonroutine nature, 
one would expect higher levels of uncertainty—and, thus, higher levels of cost, 
schedule, and performance risk—in the management of these service projects.  Best 
practices in reducing project risk include the use of a project lifecycle—with project 
phases, gates, and decision-points for monitoring and controlling the progression of 
the service project procurement process as well as the resulting service.  Without 
the use of a project lifecycle, the service project may be vulnerable to excessive risk 
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especially be true in the procurement and management of high-risk nonroutine 
services. 
Figure 7A reflects that, for routine services, a lifecycle was predominantly 
used by the Air Force, and less so (approximately less than half of the time) by the 
Army and Navy.  As seen in Figure 7B, a lifecycle approach was predominantly used 
for nonroutine services by the Navy, and less so (approximately less than half of the 
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Service Acquisition Billets and Responsibility of Staff Members 
The management of services acquisition is the responsibility of the services 
acquisition personnel located at the regional or installation organizations.  Each 
acquisition organization has designated acquisition positions, or billets, for the 
acquisition personnel.  In addition, these positions may or may not be filled, due to 
lack of personnel (perhaps personnel are deployed) or to the understaffing of 
organizations.  These acquisition personnel are also required to receive the 
appropriate training reflective of their assigned acquisition duties, such as 
contracting officer, quality assurance evaluator, or contracting officer representative.  
Thus, having an adequate number of acquisition billets in an organization is not 
sufficient.  These billets must be adequately filled, and the personnel filling these 
acquisition billets must be adequately trained.  Having an adequate number of filled 
acquisition billets, staffed with trained acquisition personnel, is integral to providing a 
proper level of oversight for monitoring contractor performance.  Finally, having a 
proper level of oversight is critically important for successful services acquisition 
management.     
The pie-charts in Figure 8 display the survey responses for these areas.  The 
following are salient observations on the charts: 
 Figure 8A shows that the Army and Air Force predominantly disagree 
that there is an adequate number of acquisition billets, while the Navy 
survey responses were inconclusive.   
 Figure 8B reveals that the Army, Navy, and Air Force all predominantly 
disagree that these acquisition billets are adequately filled. 
 Figure 8C indicates that the Navy and Air Force predominantly agree 
that the services acquisition personnel are adequately trained, while 
the Army survey responses were inconclusive.   
 Figure 8D suggests that the Army predominantly disagrees that a 
proper level of oversight is afforded to monitor the contractor’s 
performance; the Air Force predominantly agrees that a proper level of 
oversight is afforded to monitor contractor performance, and the Navy 
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4.0 Recommendations 
To improve the management of services acquisition, our first recommendation 
is to maintain the positive trend of increasing the number of competitively bid, fixed-
price contracts.  These types of contracts promote competition, which ensures that 
the government gets the right services at the best value.  Fixed-price contracts shift 
the risk of cost overruns away from the government and onto the contractor.  This 
also serves to incentivize the contractor to complete tasks within budget.   
Our second recommendation relates to the management of services 
acquisition at the regional versus installation level.  As previously discussed, each 
individual approach has advantages and disadvantages.  In our view, the key to 
success under either approach is to use the proper supporting management 
processes.  Consequently, we recommend that the Navy adopt a more disciplined 
and rigorous project management approach to its management of services 
acquisition, possibly including a virtual project management team.  This team would 
consist of the project manager, requirements manager, and contracting officer at the 
regional office.  The QAE/COR would then serve as the site manager and be 
responsible for contractor surveillance.  The QAE/COR would act as the “eyes and 
ears” of the regional project manager and contracting officer and would coordinate 
program and contracting issues back to the project manager.  This might require 
QAE/CORs who have higher-level knowledge and skills due to their expanded roles 
and responsibilities.  The Army and Air Force’s installation-level management of 
services acquisition should ensure consistency in services acquisition management 
processes department-wide.  Our recommendations include the establishment of 
dedicated installation project managers responsible for the overall cost, schedule, 
and performance requirements of the services acquisition.  Additionally, the 
installation project teams should include a requirement manager or representative 
who is authorized to identify, manage, and change the services requirement during 
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requirement manager/representative to the project team would relieve the 
contracting officer from performing these conflicting roles.  
Our third recommendation to improve the overall management of services 
acquisition is to increase the size of the acquisition workforce, reversing the 
downsizing trend that began in the 1990s.  The results of this research show that the 
number of CORs/QAEs also needs to be increased.  Increasing the size of the 
workforce will allow for better oversight and will help ensure that contractor 
performance is properly monitored.  
Our final recommendation is to increase the effectiveness and availability of 
training to ensure a qualified acquisition workforce.  Based on the results from the 
research, a majority of respondents agreed that the acquisition workforce was 
adequately trained.  Respondents also provided numerous negative comments 
regarding the poor quality of Training and the lack of training.  The recommended 
training should focus on all phases of the contract management process and related 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) policy.    Additionally, training in areas related 
to working in cross-functional teams and using project lifecycles should be provided 
to all acquisition workforce personnel.  Finally, and more importantly, if the 
contracting officers are to continue acting as de-facto project managers by leading 
the acquisition teams, then they should receive training on project management 
concepts, project control techniques, and project leadership.  
Given the total amount of money spent and the scope of services acquisition 
in the Department of Defense, the opportunity for conducting research in this 
important area is limitless.  One area that stands out as needing research is 
contracting for medical services.  We have already started to address this need.   
Finally, as discussed earlier, the researchers in the fields of operations 
management and marketing have studied and identified several key characteristics 
of services that lead to differences in the production and marketing of services as 
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must also be taken into account in designing and managing the processes involved 
in acquiring services. For example, intangibility of service outcomes makes it difficult 
to clearly describe and quantify services and, therefore, to contract for services. 
Intangibility of outputs also makes it difficult to define and measure quality.  Co-
production, which requires the presence and participation of customers in the 
creation of many services, is an important characteristic of services.  Hence, the 
contracts for software development should ideally specify not only what the service 
provider should do but also what inputs the customer should provide.  Otherwise, a 
satisfactory service outcome may not be realized.  Diversity of services also makes it 
difficult and undesirable to use the same contract vehicles or procedures for different 
services. Finally, services are complex and may involve multistage processes.  This 
makes it important yet challenging to write contracts that are flexible enough to cover 
all relevant scenarios and eventualities.  Given these considerations, we believe that 
significant opportunities exist to conduct research into the impact of these 
characteristics on the acquisition of various services and the associated implications 
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